Salpi Ghazarian: I would like to briefly introduce a member of our honorary board, a man who has for decades, even before the Soviet Union fell and even before it was fashionable, studied self-determination movements, insurgencies, and the issues and struggles of the little people around the world. He also was a Le Monde correspondent and has been described frequently as a friend of the third world. We are happy and proud that Gerard Chaliand is here today and I guarantee you that this will be the fastest hour in a long time. I welcome the ambassadors who are here and our regular friends and new friends. We’re going to cover two kinds of territory. We’re going to talk about the geopolitical realities around us as they are changing and whether we because we are living them think this is unique and amazing, or whether this is just part of what history does. And then we will talk about the three areas of Gerard’s specialization that affect us directly: self-determination movements, insurgencies and simmering conflicts.
Gerard Chaliand: Well the world is changing at a rapid pace. Seven years ago, in 2003, an omnipotent USA was stepping into Iraq and President George W. Bush intended to remodel the greater Middle East. Seven years later, Brazil, a state that nobody had really heard of in international relations in the 19th or 20th centuries, and Turkey, were together to try to mediate the dossier of Iranian nuclear issues. This is a very important change in itself. It doesn’t matter if it will succeed or not. The simple fact that Brazil and Turkey could try something is absolutely new and shows, with of course the emergence of China — China, which by the way in the end of the 18th century was producing about 30% of the world’s GDP, and is willing today to be restored to the rank that they occupied according to their own perception which was absolutely imperial in those days for 2000 years with some setbacks. India also. I remember India in 1959, when I was hitchhiking there – this was the country of absolute misery. Egypt was remarkable compared to India. India was really somewhere that you could see such a misery that you could never imagine that one day it could recover and become an important country. Well, they are now. China has changed. India has changed. What we call emerging, if we read our newspapers, with the exception of Brazil, are all reemerging states. Reemerging states because we had sent them into oblivion in the 19th century. By we, I mean the west. Europe was important in the 19th century. Europe was remodeling the world. Europe was producing the real shock of civilization. The clash of civilization occurred in the 19th century when Europe remodeled the world and occupied the whole of Asia either directly through colonialism or semi-colonialism, like in China.
Salpi Ghazarian: And re-emerging Turkey?
Gerard Chaliand: And of course, I kept the best for the end, Turkey is doing a fantastic comeback. Turkey was smart enough in 1920, 1923 to not be colonized as it should have been according to the British and the French. But from the 1920’s up until the Cold War, this was a very minor power, pretty isolated, not liked by the Arabs, not liked by the Greeks, not liked very much by the Russians, etc. Then they joined NATO because they needed security. They were very useful in NATO and then some people had the impression when the USSR collapsed that Turkey wasn’t important anymore. Wrong. Absolutely wrong. Turkey had growth, and if you have growth, you are important. After all, the Chinese are certainly not very democratic, but they have grown, and now they are taken seriously, though I don’t believe the lack of democracy is a good thing. And Turkey today, which has changed in the last eight years with AKP in 2002 has shown in 2003 that they were not only clients of the US but they had their own will. They did not want US troops to go through their territory because in 1991 they suffered very much during the first war in Iraq. Then they made a policy which was more open inside, more democratic, less corrupt, and they lately made big changes with a new policy that you might call neo-Ottoman. But it’s not necessary to draw analogies. They have a new foreign minister, who is very smart and has sold the idea that it’s important to have neighbors and that they are not just a transit way to Europe. Turkey does not consider itself as a transit way to Europe. Turkey considers itself a center, a center that is near Europe. It still wants to be a member of the European Union. They are still very good friends with the US and they will remain friends, but not clients. They have transformed their image within the Muslim world as the new champions of what is Muslim. Turkey is at the very center of the Middle East, the very center of Asia, and this isolates Armenia more than ever.
Salpi Ghazarian: This isolates Armenia more than ever if this kind of a policy continues. I don’t know if this is overreaching but Mr. Oskanian used to call it complimentarity, when it came to Armenia — you can have relations with this half of the world as well as relations with that half of the world. Now if that’s what Turkey is trying to do, is it succeeding? Is it overreaching? Is it necessarily an inevitable path?
Gerard Chaliand: Well, what Turkey is doing is diplomatic. In other words, diplomacy is gestures, it’s not necessarily acts. We don’t know how successful Turkey is going to be but I believe that they have really planted the seeds to become the only serious regional power in the Middle East. 30 or 40 years ago it was Egypt. Until 1975 or 1979, it was Iran. Now it’s Turkey. I don’t see any other country in the Middle East who can match them.
Salpi Ghazarian: Given that interest and given the evolving talk about insurgencies, Islamic fundamentalist insurgencies – in the Caucasus, particularly in the north Caucasus – where does that leave us visa vis Turkey?
Gerard Chaliand: Well it leaves Armenia very isolated with very few cards in hand. That, we have to face. I think that Turkey has important interest in Central Asia and in the Caucasus, not only with Azerbaijan but with the northern Caucasus. This after all up to a certain point has been an era of influence until the 19th century, half under Iran and the other half under Turkey, so they follow very carefully what’s going on there. In other words, Armenia now is a pretty isolated state, which has very few friends in the neighborhood.
Salpi Ghazarian: If what Armenia is engaged in and the reason Armenia and Armenians are problematic in this region and in the world is because we are supporting a self-determination movement. As good as that sounds – “international norms and principles and people’s right to self-determination” – at the end of the day, that’s not the movement that is the most popular kind and the easiest to support. Do these things work? Are we fooling ourselves? Did Kosovo work? Has East Timor worked? Are there examples of self-determination movements succeeding?
Gerard Chaliand: There are the world movements of self-determination who have achieved their aim. But we should not forget that we live in a world of double standards. Sometimes you’re on the side of the winners, and sometimes you’re not. In the case of Kosovo, who believes Kosovo would be independent if it was only Europe that had decided on its independence? Some countries in Europe who have not voted for the independence of Kosovo – the Greeks, the Spaniards – were afraid that that kind of example could reach their own country and be devastating for their own unity. It was the essentially the US that made Kosovo independent. Now, is there a state in the world that wishes Nagorno Karabakh becomes independent? I doubt it. Nevertheless, the right of self-determination is accepted in the world as a principle that is universal. Simply, it collapses. It is contradicted by another one, which says that there is an inviolability of the borders, which for the Azerbaijanis is essential, that’s all they want. There is inviolability of the borders and the choice, here, in fact is between a weak state that has nothing to sell and a rich state, which is the beginning of a pipeline, which goes to Ceyhan. Which means what? For the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the oil, and also the gas of Central Asia, which up to 1991 was going thru Moscow, is now reaching the West. Of course, interest is something as important as principles, everyone knows that.
Salpi Ghazarian: We live in a part of the world where most things are black and white. When you say if the US had not wanted Kosovo to happen, it would not have happened, it reinforces the assumption that what happens to Karabakh is not in our hands – someone, someplace will decide – a few people together in Moscow, Paris, Brussels, Washington, and c’est la vie. It is what it is.
Gerard Chaliand: That’s one of the risks. If you have to look to reality, one of the risks is that your own destiny is not entirely in your hands when you’re weak. Up to now, we have been at an advantage by the fact that the situation has been frozen. We are also at an advantage by the fact that for Russia, Nagorno Karabakh and even the surrounding territories are under the hands of the Armenians, and that means that Azerbaijan, like Georgia, cannot go on the side of the US 100%. It’s a way to control the situation because willy-nilly, in the southern Caucasus, the Russians are still the arbiter of the situation. So up to a certain point, the fact that what is going to be decided is going to be decided mainly by the Russians, because they are the main arbiter, means that the situation is not that desperate for Nagorno Karabakh.
Salpi Ghazarian: There’s a huge implication there, let me leave it on the table for the moment. Accepting as we do that fate is our favorite word, and accepting that we don’t have that many cards to play, I will not accept that we have NO cards to play. What are our cards? What could be our cards? What is it that we could be doing that we are not doing?
Gerard Chaliand: There are many things that Armenia could be doing. I think it would help to have economic growth, a more democratic system, and a more subtle and imaginative foreign policy.
Salpi Ghazarian: Do you know that the word “subtle” does not exist in the Armenian language?
Gerard Chaliand: Sometimes words don’t exist but the fact is practiced. We should never forget that Genghis Khan was a world conqueror who could not read and write – nevertheless he understood strategy. Something more subtle – I haven’t seen many initiatives in the last two or three years as far as foreign policy is concerned. The protocols were not very intelligent. I don’t see why on the problem of genocide a common Turkish and Armenian commission is needed. It’s a bit like you would make a common commission between the Germans and the Jews to discuss what happened in World War II, when the Germans have not accepted the events of 1942-45. Supposedly because there is nothing about Karabakh in the protocols, this will be forgotten? The border is closed because of Karabakh. The border is not closed because of the Genocide. It was a trick that made it look like Turkey was ready for negotiation and that Armenia was making all the difficulties and that they are not willing to go on for an open peace.
Salpi Ghazarian: The response to that is, ‘Better than nothing, we tried, and it didn’t work.’
Gerard Chaliand: It didn’t work and it will not work if the situation is not better understood – to see what cards we have in hand, which are very limited, we have not much to sell and Turkey is stronger than ever and will certainly lobby in the US to show that they would like the situation to be solved. The same thing for Azerbaijan who has not made any big mistakes in the last 15 years.
Salpi Ghazarian: Turkey’s involvement is going to help Azerbaijan in the next 5 years? Or this makes its task a little bit harder because they have to also consider their ally?
Gerard Chaliand: I think that Turkey is going to back Azerbaijan despite the fact that they had some light bickering among the two, but fundamentally they have the same interests.
Salpi Ghazarian: You were in Karabakh these past two days. What did you see? What were your impressions?
Gerard Chaliand: My impression of Karabakh is that the probability of a war is bigger than before. I will talk to you as a strategist, someone willing to understand the perception of the other side. If I was Azeri, I believe that at one point or another I would be for war, because I am facing a situation has been at a standstill for the last 15 years. War does solve problems up to a certain point. And it creates new opportunities for the winner. A surprise attack is something that we should be prepared to face. The surprise will be very short because the Russians will intervene – they are the arbiter of the situation and they will be the peace keeping force. In the meantime, what is important is to reduce casualties as much as possible because the bombing will be heavy. It will not only be on the first, second and third lines, it will also be on Stepanakert where it is important to be able to shelter the population so that we reduce losses because one of the problems with Karabakh is demography. Karabakh is a region that cannot stomach ten thousand deaths.
Salpi Ghazarian: If the solution is either you win the war or you don’t go to war, how do you not go to war? What do you do so you do not go to war?
Gerard Chaliand: If you do not want to go to war, you must make some concessions. One has to consider what concessions Armenians are ready to make in order to avoid a direct confrontation because we cannot remain stubbornly with the same position without changing at all.
Salpi Ghazarian: The problem with that sort of sensible, logical approach is that what we hear back, whether it’s from the Azeris or from the negotiators or from the international community is that of course you must negotiate, you must concede so that there will be peace. Our answer often, my answer certainly, is that if you show me how I am secure and there will be peace, and I am not losing the security I have arranged for myself not with NATO help, not with American or Russian help, for myself, by myself, I am secure today – how will I not lose that and in 20 years not repeat the situation that exists. How do you offer me a sustainable peace if in this current environment so that my possible concessions make sense?
Gerard Chaliand: I believe that if there is a possibility of a negotiation that should be guaranteed by powers. After all there are areas where UN troops have made that look hopeless is going on for 10, 20, 30 years and finally has created a de facto situation which will remain as it is. It will be very important to have guarantees with something materialized on the field itself and not just a piece of paper.
Salpi Ghazarian: A) I don’t trust the UN and the European security guarantees because there is security peace keeping fatigue in the world today. And B) the way Aliev and Mammadyrov talk, after those poor soldiers were killed ten days ago, for Mammadyrov to say, ‘This is a message to the world and we will continue to do this until our territories are returned’ – under those circumstances, how do we in good conscience do the sensible thing?
Gerard Chaliand: You’re asking me the $100,000 question. Frankly, if there is a solution, I do not have it. It’s a very different situation and it has to be tackled because if we do not tackle it, I do not think we will avoid that surprise attack one day or another.
Salpi Ghazarian: Let’s go back to Turkey and Iran. We talked about Turkey and its new role, about Russia with its permanent interests in this region being the first person on the line to be the arbiter, and Iran, and Iran’s place now in the world and what appears to be a newly awakened interest in Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Gerard Chaliand: On paper, the countries which are rather friendly to the Armenian position are Iran, China — few people know that China is interested in Armenia — and to a large extent, Russia. Russia is interested in keeping Armenia because you always like an ally who has no choice but to remain your ally because there is no alternative. Russia will always be interested in Armenia, and it does help Russia to keep Azerbaijan dependent by the fact that Armenian troops are in Karabakh. It’s exactly like the problem of Georgia with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, they have the same card with Nagorno Karabakh. The big difference is that they spoke about the possible independence of Abkhazia a long time ago, and they have never spoken about the possible independence of Nagorno Karabakh. So in other words, it’s because we have nothing to sell and that the Azerbaijanis have Baku, Tbilisi, Ceyhan, they are in a much better position. In other words, we don’t have the easy work.
Salpi Ghazarian: We’ve done a tour of the region but we haven’t talked about the Kurds.
Gerard Chaliand: The Kurds are in a very good position these days in Iraq. They have enjoyed peace from about 1997 to now; they have been able to build a de facto autonomous region, which really is more than autonomous, in fact it’s a sort of semi independent area, and they did worry a lot about the fact that Iran doesn’t like them, that Turkey didn’t like them, that Syria doesn’t like them, that Arabs in Iraq also don’t like them too much. In fact, whoever is going to be the prime minister in Iraq, might try, if the US leaves next year, that there will be a union of the Arabs against the Kurds. But, something new happened. This year, there has been the creation of a Turkish consulate in Iraq, and the relationship between Turkey and the Kurds of Iraq are good. Why? Because the Kurds do sell them oil at a very interesting price, and will sell them gas at a good price very soon, and that the Turks have decided that they could have a very important influence on this ex-vilayet (region) of Musul, which was the Kurdish region Britain took from Turkey in 1920 to join it to the two Arab regions of Basra and Baghdad. Now, the influence of Turkey is starting with new schools. They have the TV which is very important as media influence and they will have a de facto presence in this area that they consider as belonging to them. If there is also some agreement, not with the PKK of course, but with other Kurds who are willing to live in the framework of a democratic Turkey, which allows them cultural rights and some political rights, then Turkey will become more important and more secure inside. If the policy of Mr. Erdogan is subtle enough, if he is not jeopardized by the army, I think that they can manage. The Kurds will never get an independent state, but they will get more freedom and more democracy after 80 years of fighting.”
Nareg Seferian: I wanted to ask about national self-determination and where it gets its legitimacy from – is it just some arbitrary idea that Woodrow Wilson bestowed upon the world or does it have some other legal basis or is it that if the national self-determination movement wins in its armed struggle, then it becomes legitimate.
Gerard Chaliand: Self-determination is recognized by the United Nations, it is recognized by the declaration of human rights in 1948. In other words, it is one of the principles that is universally admitted. But of course the right to self-determination was understood essentially after 1948 as the right to get rid of European colonialism. You had the right to self-determination if you were colonized by the British, the French, the Portuguese, the Belgians, etc. The right to be self-determined elsewhere was always denied. What do we have? Who did self-determine elsewhere? We have the fact that it happened in Eurethria, which by the way was a former Italian colony; it happened with Bangladesh, formerly Eastern Pakistan, and that was due to Mrs. Gandi, and then you will look at other examples. Lately you had Timor, which by the way was Portuguese, so they had three decades of very harsh depression, and you have had Kosovo because of the will of Mr. George W. Bush. Everywhere else, if you got something it was through a balance of force, through war. We will see for instance in southern Sudan, where they have also normally the right of self-determination – if they get it or not, will that be backed? Will it be in the interest of the West? Will it be of interest to anyone that they become independent? That’s an open question. So that’s why the right of self-determination is very fluid, let’s say.