I didn’t think when I was living and studying here, nearly 20 years ago, that I would be here one day, talking about my book. I remember stopping at the old NAASR building looking at everyone else’s books. I’m pleased that NAASR has agreed to distribute this book. I also used to come to Bentley to hear lectures but I didn’t know that I’d be giving one myself on these very interesting 10 years.
This year out of office, I’ve had time to reflect on this last decade of my life. During those years in the ministry, I was always aware that we are living history. You can’t let that thought drive your actions, but every now and then, especially on a Sunday, sitting alone in my office, I felt the responsibility of history.
This book is a small way of paying back. I believe government officials, especially of our small, new country, owe it to our people to go on the record with what we’ve done and why. This book, although just a collection of speeches, is really a mirror of the evolution of our foreign policy of the last decade.
“Speaking To Be Heard,” the title of the book in English, expresses the underlying purpose of each and every one of these nearly 100 speeches – making Armenia’s voice heard on the world stage, and bringing Armenia’s situation in the world to Armenian audiences.
“Anavart Tasnameak,” the incomplete decade, is the Armenian title and that too expresses the deep conviction that we still have lots to do—all of us, in government and out of government—history is still being written.
In the introduction to the book, I explain that just as every new administration in any country, when we came into office, we too were faced with decisions about different foreign policy directions. In some areas, we continued on the same path, in others we forged a new path.
Now, as I look back at those major policy areas, I see how today’s new administration, too, is making choices about areas of continuity and areas of change. Naturally, some of those decisions I agree with, and others I don’t agree with. Nevertheless, what is obviously true is that given our geography, our neighborhood and the geopolitical developments around us, our room to maneuver is limited. In that light, even small nuanced changes can and do impact our situation.
When I was appointed, in 1998, I believed that our foreign policy efforts had to be aimed in five major directions: complementarity, of course relations with Turkey and the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, multilateralism and European integration. These five areas pretty much cover the length and breadth of Armenia’s foreign relations, philosophies, choices and limitations.
The first one — complementarity — was born because we were obliged to rethink the older, and simpler, policy of balance that had guided decisions in the early days of the Republic.
It had always been apparent that the new Republic of Armenia would and should have good relations with all three major power centers – the European Union, Russia and the United States. The thinking was that we had to be bold and open with friends and foes. We stated that we are not obliged to choose among friends, that Armenia can be the place where the overlapping interests of the European Union, Russia and the United States or any two seemingly adversarial, competing countries, can prosper and where their divergent interests will never be exploited or manipulated in pursuit of our own national interests. We rejected a return to a Cold War mentality, insisting that it is not in anyone’s interests, including those of the big powers, to return to that era. Armenia adhered firmly to this approach for the sake of our own future, and to reduce global tensions. We preferred to be the country that found ways to conflate the others’ conflicting interests, rather than exacerbate and exploit them, for short-term, local gain.
To apply complementarity effectively, we had to take it upon ourselves to be considerate of all those friendly to Armenia. This is a pre-emptive way of choosing voluntary cooperation where desirable in order to avoid compulsory collaboration where objectionable.
Without this policy, it would have not been possible to dare remain in a strategic partnership with Russia, to be a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a Russian-led security arrangement, and at the same time bring our relationship with NATO to a level short of membership. Of the former Soviet republics, we are the only country with such multilayered alliances.
As I look back, it’s clear that what we did and what is being done today are significantly different. For complementarity to succeed, it must be publicly invoked, in order to prevent the public and private pressures to choose. Especially in light of the unprecedented military confrontation that erupted in the Caucasus last summer between Georgia and Russia, and the tensions that persist between the two, our only line of protection is to publicly and repeatedly pronounce our unwillingness to take sides. In other words, the issue of complementarity came to our door. If before, we had applied the concept to two distant allies — Russia and the US, now we had to apply it to Russia and Georgia, both strategic allies, with whom we must maintain good relations.
The second policy area is Turkey-Armenia relations. This is one area where we had both continuity and change. We continued the first administration’s sound policy of normalizing relations with Turkey, without preconditions, establishing diplomatic ties and having the border opened. But we added a new element – the recognition of the genocide as a foreign policy goal, while at the same time, clearly explaining that the recognition by Turkey was not a precondition. So with a new addition, the policy of unconditional normalization remained the same.
We engaged Turkey in extensive negotiations to normalize relations. But because of Turkey’s close affiliation with Azerbaijan, we always suspected that Turkey was more interested in showing that there is some process with Armenia, rather than an outcome. We understood that they cannot deliver a border opening because of Azerbaijani pressure. After all, let’s not forget that Turkey closed the border in 1993 because Azerbaijan lost territories surrounding Nagorno Karabakh to Armenian control. At the same time, Turkey needed some process to show to the world that there is discussion with Armenia so they could say don’t interfere in genocide issues, so they could try to stem the tide of genocide recognition and so they could say, let’s move on with European integration.
So, although we were talking, we did so with the understanding that that process would remain confidential so that Turkey would not be able to exploit the situation and benefit from a process.
The new Armenian administration, although continuing the same policy, took a different approach to the negotiation process. By inviting President Gul, they took the process public, and continued to talk. That process reached fruition when on April 22, the foreign ministries of Turkey and Armenia put out a joint statement that they’ve agreed on a roadmap to normalize relations.
This automatically introduced a new element in the Nagorno Karabakh process, because soon after that announcement, Turkish leaders repeatedly said that they can’t move on the Armenian-Turkish process until something is done to satisfy Azerbaijan’s concerns. So, although everybody stuck their necks out to work to open the border, Turkey made clear that until Azerbaijan is satisfied on the Nagorno Karabakh issue, they can’t move to open the border. So now the pressure is on the Armenian side to appease Azerbaijan so they will ease their pressure on Turkey and Turkey in turn will be able to open the border. This means that in the coming weeks and months, there will be huge pressure on the Armenian side to move on this issue.
Pressures are not new in diplomacy. Armenia has been through this before. Such pressures will always come. The trick is to resist them without alienating international partners.
In 2002, Turkey wanted to take on the chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. This organization of 54 countries has a different country as chairman each year. This is also the organization which oversees the mediation of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. It was clear that a Turkish chairmanship would create all sorts of unforeseen problems for us. Fortunately the OSCE operates on the consensus rule. That means all decisions must be passed unanimously. The no vote of any one country in effect becomes a veto.
So for nearly two years, at each opportunity any one of these 54 countries would approach us to try to convince us that such a chairmanship would not constitute a problem for Armenia and that Armenia ought to comply with the trend. In the end, we triumphed.
We triumphed because the consensus rule worked. And ironically, about a decade earlier, when the OSCE was considering changing the consensus rule, the decision was blocked by one vote – ours.
The next policy area that we pursued is multilateralism. It was my conviction from day 1, and after 10 years that belief has been reinforced, that in order for Armenia, a small country with limited resources to be heard, we had and have to be engaged in global issues, we have to be considerate of the issues of other countries, and also of regional and global problems. Talking about issues ranging from non-proliferation to arms control to climate change, as well as conflicts elsewhere, means that when it comes to our turn to talk about our issues, the rest of the world is more attentive to our cause and concerns.
And finally, European integration. This is an indispensable tool for bringing change within the country, in Armenia. Our relationship with three European institutions – the Council of Europe, the European Union and NATO – evolved over the years. Each provided clear instruments for cooperation and a blueprint for reforms and development. The principles they advocate are the ones that have been tested for centuries. It remains for Armenia to adopt and implement them. I have repeatedly said to the Council of Europe leadership and to our own people, Armenians have been beneficiaries of the process of accession to European structures. Unfortunately with every passing election, we realize that our reforms have not gone far or deep enough. The latest evidence is the last presidential election and the city council election of the last two weeks.
There are many reasons for this. In the countries of the former Soviet Union, it was becoming clear that we are not developing deeply and broadly enough economically to grow the middle class necessary for democratic institutions and processes. There are three fundamental premises that we must rethink if we are to come out of this cycle of expectations and disappointments.
First and foremost, we have embarked on new, liberal, free-market development but have misunderstood “development.” Development is a political process, not an economic one. It requires political changes in society and an organized process of engaging both elites and public, without threatening one or discouraging the other. Development doesn’t mean spending money on infrastructure; it means infrastructures that are designed and maintained by a responsive state apparatus with functioning governance systems. Developing into a modern society requires the provision of fair, transparent public services and institutions which operate on the basis of a system of checks and balances. Only political will and a change in political thinking can bring that about. Our countries must develop politically in order to develop economically.
Second, pretense at democratization is dangerous and counterproductive. It distorts the relationship between government and the governed, raising expectations that can’t be met, obstructing progress that could be taking place elsewhere in society. There are many prosperous countries in the world which are not democratic, and don’t pretend to be. Singapore is one example of a thriving country where democratic rights are largely suspended. If our government and our people really want democratization, which I believe is the unquestionable choice, then we must actively, genuinely, patiently, consistently work to build the institutions that will make that happen. It will not come with petulant street protests.
And third, the Soviet-era definition of power continues to distort the modern concept of legitimate authority. World leaders like Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela and Martin Luther King had no power but operated from a position of authority. They accomplished things that changed the world. Except for a brief period immediately after independence, our society has questioned the legitimacy of its government, and governments have not enjoyed the support of the governed. Hard power will not compensate for this suspicion and assure our leaders the authority they require to bring about significant, lasting political or economic change.
As these speeches indicate, each time I addressed foreign policy issues, I concluded with domestic issues. For any country, especially a developing one like ours, internal developments are of primary importance. The international community looks to our domestic successes as they gauge the legitimacy of our international needs and challenges. So does the Diaspora. You, too, follow events in Armenia and hope to see the improvements that reflect your dreams.
So do I. I left office because although I believed that I had been an effective advocate of Armenia’s interests abroad, I knew I could no longer do so unless we ourselves advocated for advancement and change at home.
I am doing that now through the Civilitas Foundation. Working with local and international organizations, with the media, with young people and activists to understand and explain where we want to go and how to get there. For that to succeed, Armenia will continue to require your active engagement. My message to the Diaspora is always the same – don’t take what we’ve accomplished for granted, but at the same time, don’t be satisfied with what we have.