Attempts to analyze the present state of Armeno-Turkish relations are based on one of two hypotheses.The first is that Turkey will not open its border with Armenia without a Karabagh settlement or progress toward one. In short, it won’t open the border without Azerbaijan’s assent. For the proponents of this theory, the signing of the August 31 protocols is a nightmarish development: Those documents have given Turkey, in writing, everything it had wanted of Armenia since Armenia’s independence but had been unable to gain.
In other words, Armenia has not yet gotten what it expects of Turkey, the opening of the border—a tangible, physical act—whereas Turkey’s expectations of Armenia are merely statements, which it has already gotten, and in writing at that.
From the moment that the protocols were made public, they allowed Turkey to reap rewards—diplomatic, political, moral, and other—because the Armenian government had given its assent to those documents. It’s not possible to assert, therefore, that so long as parliament has not approved the protocols Turkey has not achieved what it wanted of Armenia regarding the genocide and territorial demands.
As soon as the protocols were made public, many pundits and the representatives of the administration hailed the absence of any mention of Karabagh in those documents as a great diplomatic achievement. But if we take into account that Turkey’s highest officials have in the past year-and-a-half taken every opportunity to proclaim that the Armenia-Turkey border would open only after a settlement of the Karabagh question, we must reach the opposite conclusion: Only if the Karabagh question were referenced in the protocols, with the clear formulation that Karabagh is in no way connected to the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations, could we have talked of a diplomatic victory.
Because only such a reference would have precluded the Turkish foreign minister from asserting—as he did just one day after the protocols were made public—that the settlement of the Karabagh issue is a precondition for the establishment of Armeno-Turkish relations.
Moreover, a sober assessment inevitably reveals the following dangerous scenario. The Turkish executive branch, by seeking to improve relations with Armenia, has displayed its “goodwill” before the entire world; as “an established democracy,” however, it cannot force its will on parliament. It’s already evident from the reactions of Turkish legislators that the protocols-related ruckus in parliament will be loud. And so the Turkish government could easily explain to the international powers that in order for the protocols to be ratified by its parliament, the Armenian side should make at least some concessions on Karabagh and evacuate the territories adjacent to Karabagh.
The second hypothesis is that Turkey is prepared to move toward opening the border even at the cost of temporarily or outwardly alienating Azerbaijan, and so Armenia must also expend every effort toward that end. The proponents of this theory can be provisionally divided into two groups.
The first thinks that the opening of the Armenia-Turkey border takes precedence over all other concerns, and so the Armenian side can refrain from asserting historical concerns, because in an environment of open borders those issues could more easily be resolved between the two nations.
The adherents of this interpretation of the situation must nevertheless realize that the Karabagh issue cannot be bypassed. If Turkey agrees to open the border without first obtaining any progress favorable to Azerbaijan regarding the Karabagh issue, there can be no doubt that it will have done so only because it has obtained clear promises from international powers that all territories abutting Karabagh will be returned to Azerbaijan without any guarantee of a final status for Karabagh.
The second group understands the incontrovertible necessity of opening the border, but it is not prepared to achieve it at all costs. And that is the very basis on which a healthy debate must unfold. It would be an irreversible mistake for the Armenian parliament to discount all the dangers lurking in the protocols merely for the sake of saving face for the executive branch. Although it’s clear that including the mechanism of parliamentary ratification was Turkey’s idea, we should nevertheless attempt to take advantage of it by allowing for the possibility of either inserting modifications into this version of the document or rejecting it altogether.
And finally, it is important to recognize that independent Armenia, as a sovereign state, would for the first time be signing a joint agreement with Turkey having to do with territory, borders, and our most painful issue, the genocide—and that cannot be done merely as a matter of political expediency. It’s also apparent that the documents, in their present form, are not in our national interest. Efforts to present the protocols as a great diplomatic victory cannot be taken seriously. Armenia’s previous administrations, however, over the last 17 years, have refrained from such a step, because they had a sense of political and historical responsibility.
Calling a Spade a Spade