Mr. Oskanian, it’s been a while since the Armenian leadership declared that foreign policy should be pro-active and enterprising. In your opinion, can we assess, albeit preliminarily, the results of that approach, and generally what differences do you see between the pro-active approach and the foreign policy that came before?
About being enterprising, I want to say two things. First, before ‘initiating’ something in foreign relations, we must be able to calculate all steps from beginning to end, otherwise the initiative may work against the initiator. Second, being enterprising must be correctly understood. International relations are not static, and at different times, a country is under pressure to take or not take a step, to implement steps or counter other steps being taken in the immediate environment. In such a situation, deciding not to act requires as much initiative as deciding to act. For example, if the April 22 joint statement by the Armenian and Turkish foreign ministries was the product of a pro-active policy, then deciding not to take such a step could also be called being pro-active. If participating in NATO exercises is the result of a decision to be pro-active, the decision not to participate is equally pro-active. It is important to understand the nature of the initiative. The point I want to make is if we think that it is only by initiating ever-new steps that a policy or a country is pro-active, then, in the process of reaching for that next step, we risk going down the wrong road, as we’ve recently witnessed.
If we try to understand the situation through a specific example, then the recent meeting between the Armenian and Georgian presidents was quite telling. The meeting between Serzh Sargsyan and Mikheil Saakashvili took place in such a friendly environment, with announcements that sounded more like dinner toasts, and for a moment it seemed that we are not talking about an Armenia and a Georgia that in recent months have had political, cultural and religious issues, rather that this was a meeting between the mayors of two sister cities. In your opinion, does such a high-level meeting, and one that is burdened with the all of the conditions surrounding Armenia-Georgia relations, fit within the framework of Armenia’s enterprising and pro-active policy?
My impression is that it was quite a formal meeting. I would have wanted to see as an outcome of this meeting a more concrete agreement on projects of strategic importance and a serious exploration of the problematic issues still pending. For example, documents that preliminarily formalize the construction of a highway leading to Batumi, or a decision on simplifying border-crossing processes.
One cannot deny the importance of Georgia to Armenia. We’ve had a big agenda and that must be deepened by the day. Each meeting must contribute to the further deepening and institutionalization of relations. The Russian-Georgian war demonstrated that Armenia, too, has strategic importance for Georgia. There are more things that we have in common today, than there are things that separate us. We must focus on identifying those commonalities and through specific programs, start work on areas of common interest. But at the same time, to have the audacity, to explore the serious issues remaining between us and find solutions to them.
Taking into consideration the existing problems and episodes in Armenia-Georgia relations, what do you think about the award given Mikhail Saakashvili, and the reactions from Russia?
This was, after all, Armenia’s sovereign decision. Even if it was the wrong decision, that’s our internal matter. But the fact that there indeed are such public and negative reactions from other countries is unfortunate. In fact, this is not the first time that we find ourselves in such a situation. The issue of participating or not participating in NATO exercises in Georgia also put Armenia in such a, shall we say, undesirable situation. I am convinced that the fundamental reason here is that Armenia seems to have put aside the policy of complementarity – we don’t seem to believe that we should and that we can indeed maintain complementary relations with all our neighbors and interested countries. So, if we have retreated from complementarity, then other countries’ expectations of Armenia will change. That is why our actions are met by very open and direct criticism from one or another side.
There are expert opinions that given the geopolitical changes that took place in our region in 2008, a more careful and thought-through foreign policy would be more appropriate for Armenia. What do you say?
It is indeed possible to summarize what I’ve said in that way, and so, I agree with the assessment. After the Russian-Georgian war, after the change of American administration, the situation is quite fluid. On the one hand, we notice a certain rapprochement between the US and Russia, on the other hand, these countries are to some extent consolidating their positions in our region. In such an ever-changing environment, Armenia’s policies must remain very flexible in order to allow all kinds of adjustments.
In your opinion, what triggered Russian President Dimitri Medvedev’s visit to Baku, especially if we note that it took place just days after Saakashvili’s visit to Yerevan, a visit during which he made several serious anti-Russian statements. Plus, Medvedev made that visit days before the G8 Summit, and before his meeting with US President Barack Obama? Why did he go to Baku?
Naturally, the main reason is Russia’s own general interests. Russia is engaged in consolidating its position in the region, especially in the run-up to the Summit with Obama. Today, the situation is such that a rapprochement between Russia and Azerbaijan may come at Armenia’s expense. This is one of the fundamental changes that has taken place in our region.
How should we interpret the statement Medvedev made in Baku on Nagorno Karabakh, on “imminent” resolution, a resolution within the framework of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, one that can be seen on the basis of decisions of the UN and other international organizations, especially if we remember that those decisions are not beneficial to Armenia. Aliev and Medvedev cited the Meindorf Declaration which mentions those decisions and which Armenia has signed?
I had said months ago that Armenia ought to have done everything to avoid signing that declaration last fall. That was a serious diplomatic blunder. That declaration has made it easier for Russia and other countries in their relations with Azerbaijan, by making it possible for them to make pro-Azerbaijani statements on the issue of Nagorno Karabakh. Armenia must do everything to neutralize that declaration and diminish its impact.
Armenia’s position on Nagorno Karabakh has always been conditional on Armenia’s domestic situation. How do you assess that situation today?
There are always three factors that impact a country’s political positions: the interests of those countries who are active in the region; the trends in international organizations at that point in time; and a country’s internal political and economic situation. In all three of these directions, today there are changes. First, there is a new Russian-American rapprochement, there is Turkey’s greater role in the Nagorno Karabakh issue, as a result of the Armenia-Turkey public dialogue. Second, trends in international organizations are not so favorable to us following Kosovo, S. Ossetia and Abkhazia. And third, of course, our internal political and economic situation is quite complicated. The economic decline continues, we still don’t see the end of it. Plus, the unhealthy domestic political scene, the absence of checks and balances in the country, the ever-deepening frustration and hopelessness in our population, to put it mildly, don’t help our active engagement on the international stage. For a country to speak from a position of strength internationally, its leaders must command a position of strength internally. Controlling all the political and administrative tools at its disposal does not translate to strength. A government’s strength is derived from the trust of its people, and that is most important internationally as well.
How do you assess the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1667 which was just passed?
Aside from its content, so long as Armenia remains on the agenda of PACE, we all lose. The recent PACE events, the internal skirmishes that we’ve all witnessed simply come to reinforce my response to your earlier question. Our domestic problems don’t allow us to be effective in the outside world.
As you said, Armenia remains under OSCE monitoring. In your opinion, does that serve Armenia’s purposes or Europe’s?
European structures should not be viewed as the solution to our problems. Neither opposition nor government should see them that way. The European structures won’t solve our problems, they will simply give us the opportunity to bring the European experience to Armenia to support democratization processes. If we don’t want to take advantage of that opportunity, no one will force us to do so. If European values continue to be merely theoretical, Europe will do nothing to put them into practice. That’s our task. Armenia has been a CoE member for eight years, and it’s shameful that we remain subject to monitoring.
Mr. Oskanian, in Armenia there is the impression that often we confuse the primary and the secondary, and that perhaps that’s done intentionally. Today, do you think there is the need to present the situation thoroughly and clearly to the public, or is everything already obvious to everyone? Is there a need to define, to articulate the problems between the governed and the government, or does everyone already know what they are, but no one’s really interested?
In Armenia, political and public processes lack transparency. The consistent distortion of reality, the absence of honesty both on the part of the authorities and on the part of the opposition in fact, has brought us to deep polarization and equally deep indifference. Nevertheless, the significant segment of society which is usually a majority, is disenchanted, and is passive between elections, can see and accurately analyze what is going on, independently of the efforts of the authorities or the opposition to veil it.
In your opinion, what steps must be taken to overcome that polarization and indifference? What can serve as a unifying idea for the public to rally around? What or who can prevail over the public’s disenchantment?
There is no other way to create a healthy state than through a political system that has at least two poles and is based on political checks and balances. Today, in Armenia, we really have just one, the ruling pole, which despite the existence of an opposition, really has no countermeasure. We are speaking about not just about alternative levers of influence, but also alternative ideology.
Especially now, after the Yerevan Council elections during which the authorities’ total control was so acutely manifested, it is time for the establishment of such pole. The purpose of this must not be to be rid of the authorities at all cost. Experience has shown that this results in the authorities more tightly consolidating their resources to hang on to power. The purpose must be to forge a strong second pole which can create appropriate checks and balances mechanisms within the branches of government. Such a second pole will become an alternative to the existing power coalition. The authorities will see that grabbing power will be more costly than sharing power.