Mr. Oskanian, the Madrid principles as they’ve been made public, are they more acceptable to Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh or to Azerbaijan? In general, how do you assess that proposal?
If we’re speaking about the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, public sentiment can theoretically be divided into two segments. For one segment, any sort of concession is unacceptable. For this segment then, any document that emerges from Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiations, is in and of itself unacceptable. This approach is understandable but then, in this case, we must accept that we do not need negotiations, and that option depends solely on the price that Armenians are prepared to pay.
Nevertheless, if the issue is to reach a negotiated settlement, then it is important to understand that any document that is the product of Armenian-Azerbaijani talks must be viewed from two different perspectives. First, the principles on which the document is based. Second, the document itself in all its detail. For example, if one of the principles is that the people of Nagorno Karabakh have the right to self-determination, that principle is naturally considered acceptable. But in the final document, how this principle is actually formulated, is a different matter.
Another example: If one of the principles is the return of territories surrounding Nagorno Karabakh, that, at first glance, is unacceptable. But if, as a result of negotiations, it is possible to reach an agreement that the return of those territories of strategic significance take places only after the right of self-determination is realized, and even then, not in their totality, that is an altogether different matter. Therefore, principles are an important basis, but the details are the determinants. During my years as minister, we couldn’t reach an agreement with Azerbaijan over the document’s details. There was a clear bar which we had set for ourselves, based on our national interest; we were not willing to lower that bar and we did not do so.
In your view, compared to the earlier ones, is this a move in a positive direction or a negative one? Please cite concrete facts and examples.
I don’t know what this ‘renewed’ document is that they’re talking about. But in the one I’m familiar with, the right of the people of Nagorno Karabakh to self-determination has been codified, and so that document is more favorable in comparison to those that came before. But as negotiators say, nothing is agreed until everything is agreed, so whether this is a good or bad document depends largely on how effectively and prudently the Armenian side will conduct the negotiations.
Is it not a negative development for Armenians that the OSCE Minsk Group’s prior language — ‘withdrawal of Armenian forces from occupied territories’ or ‘contiguous land border’ — has been replaced by the phrases ‘the return of territories adjacent to Nagorno Karabakh to Azerbaijani control’ or ‘land link’? And, in general, are the interests of the Minsk Group co-chair countries in the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh issue more congruent with the interests of Armenians or Azerbaijanis?
In general, the objective of the co-chairs has been to bring the positions of the two sides closer. For them, under normal circumstances, how and what kind of a resolution is reached is not as important as simply the fact of reaching a resolution. Of course, from time to time, the co-chairs will make an announcement which causes dissatisfaction for one or another side. But that shouldn’t worry us so much as when co-chair countries, for whatever reason, feel the necessity to resolve the Nagorno Karabakh issue at all cost, in order to ‘disentangle’ another knot. In such a situation, other factors too will come into play. As I have often said, Turkey’s masterful exploitation of Armenia-Turkey relations may provide such an excuse.
How do you interpret the view that the current unfavorable situation of the Nagorno Karabakh process is the product of your and former President Kocharyan’s policies?
Each administration is responsible for its term in office and for documents it has signed. During the past 10 years, we had succeeded in moving away from the Lisbon principles which provided Nagorno Karabakh with a maximum of autonomy within Azerbaijan, to a point where the right of the people of Nagorno Karabakh to self-determination was reinforced. Further, during this time, there were no concessions on the issue of Nagorno Karabakh. On the contrary. Nagorno Karabakh with its surrounding territories and with an unobstructed link with Armenia, not only survived but also registered noticeable development. Nevertheless, each new administration has a right to step back from what it has received from the former administration, if it so wishes. A change of administration offers such a historic opportunity. In 1998, that opportunity was used. So, today’s processes are the responsibility of those in charge today. And we should judge the situation, not only based on the content of the document, but also on the circumstances which have been created around us as a result of our own foreign policy.
In your view, is it necessary that Nagorno Karabakh become a full party to negotiations? If yes, then why was that presence not assured during the Kocharyan years?
Nagorno Karabakh’s participation in the negotiations was disrupted in March 1997 when the Minsk group negotiations themselves were broken off. But Nagorno Karabakh has not been left out of the process. It was only in a rare instance that the co-chairs would visit the region and not go to Stepanakert or not visit with the Nagorno Karabakh authorities. Of course, taking into consideration the fact that there cannot be a resolution without the agreement of the authorities and people of Nagorno Karabakh, the direct participation of Nagorno Karabakh is desirable, and even essential, and that’s always been acknowledged. Nevertheless in 1998 when the Republic of Armenia was faced with a dilemma – to carry out the negotiations inherited from the former administration, and to do so at the presidential level, or to generally withdraw from negotiations, the decision was made in favor of continuing negotiations. But again, any administration, faced with such a choice, can make a different determination.