Mr. Oskanian, it is obvious today that the executive branch and their majority in parliament are for signing the Armenia-Turkey protocols. It seems nothing stands in their way especially since their representatives constantly say that given the population’s grave socio-economic situation, it is obvious that they support the signing since that is the only way to have the border open.
First, there are more dignified ways to arrive at an open border, I’m certain of that. Today, it’s obvious that both in Armenia, and in the Diaspora the general mood is quite apparent. In Armenia, as a result of discussions, however superficial, and after Serzh Sargsya’s foreign visits, it’s obvious that there is a great deal of resistance to this initiative. As a result of this process, whose dangers were apparent to me early on, our nation finds itself in a complicated situation, from which the government is not trying to extricate itself; rather, it’s further intensifying it.
At the beginning of the Armenia-Turkey process, the political forces were reserved in their comments, and the pitfalls did not seem obvious to many. Was it possible to avoid publicizing these documents and to take the process in another direction?
Of course it was possible, but what we have today is the worst-case scenario. First, the process went public, which on the one hand enticed the Turkish side to exploit the process for its own sake, and as a result, important countries with differing interests engaged at very high levels.
Second, the Armenian government succumbed to artificial and senseless timetables which served the interests of other countries. On April 22, they made a statement which provided President Obama with the opportunity not to use the term ‘genocide’; then came the premature publicizing of these protocols with a date for signing that would give Serzh Sargsyan the justification he needs to attend the football game in Turkey. As a result of the administration’s miscalculations and their ignoring obvious realities, we have today two very serious problems. First, a hasty and badly negotiated document which even in the case of the most pragmatic interpretation, goes counter to our national interests. Second, a continuing and unpredictable process on which the Republic of Armenia has zero leverage and influence.
Today it’s a fact that as a result of those documents there is serious tension, to say the least, in our society. Therefore, there is a serious problem with this document, right? But to pull off such an agreement with Turkey, it would have been necessary to enjoy serious majority support. Today, not only is there no such support, but the contrary is true. The authorities had no right to put our people in such a situation.
Mr. Oskanian, your criticism can leave the impression that there is some jealousy or envy.
Any fair-thinking individual would realize that the man who is to sign this document is not to be envied. Further, those who are forced to explain away my criticism by calling it jealousy do so because they can’t publicly accept their own failures, and it turns out they’re well aware that they’re in a difficult situation. During the president’s closed-door meetings with the Diaspora, eve government representatives said that this is a badly negotiated document, but because it’s already on the table, they are forced to defend it. But I would like to point out that this is not something like a tax-legislation package that we can say is not so great, but we can pass it, and then later see about improving it. This is that critical document which assesses our past and pre-determines our future.
But those who defend the documents say that there are no pre-conditions in the protocols and even stress that the words ‘genocide’ or ‘Karabakh’ are not even there.
Did they really think that there, black on white, it was supposed to say that we renounce the genocide issue and Karabakh, too? Those who defend this document, who resist seeing the obvious realities, would, I suppose, find ways to prove their position even if that were the case. You know, if some people don’t wish to see reality, that doesn’t mean that reality does not exist. With these protocols, the Turks have seen expressed their 17 years of preconditions – a commission that studies historic events and documents, and recognition of borders. In fact, since ‘making news’ and ‘taking initiative’ are in vogue in Armenia these days, let me assure you that by signing these protocols, Armenia will indeed be the first in the world in one thing – in the history of diplomacy, there are no other protocols which affirm the recognition of existing borders; there is no such principle in the world. There are more than 190 countries in the world and nearly that many territorial disputes. Those countries have diplomatic relations, recognize each other’s territorial integrity, without confirming each other’s borders, or at least not formulated in such a way. Today, when Aliyev can stand on the lands of Nakhichevan and insolently proclaim that Zangezur is Azerbaijani territory, Armenia’s recognizing Turkey’s present borders is simply political shortsightedness. So, these two preconditions are in fact in this document; while the other one – about Karabakh – is something that Erdogan reminds us about daily. No matter how much the Armenian government insists that NK is not a precondition, no matter how often the co-chairs insist that NK is not a precondition, at the end of the day, who is it who will open the border – the same person who is announcing that NK is indeed a precondition.
Today there are some who analyze the domestic political situation, and issues related to democratization and conclude that all this facilitates foreign pressure on Armenia.
You know, in 18 years, democracy in Armenia has never been in an enviable state. I was foreign minister for 10 years and I can assure all those who don’t know, as well as all those who know but wish to mislead the public, that the international community cannot force a government to take steps it does not wish to take. And those who wish to justify the government’s foreign policy by invoking the idea of foreign pressure, they are simply aiding in the implementation of this flawed policy.
Nevertheless, responding to your criticism, many respond by saying that Armenia was seriously weakened after the last presidential election, after the events of March 1, and thus it became easier for the international community and the superpowers to push the Armenian government to take steps which assume greater risk. And in this context, there is often mention of your share of the guilt.
Every government since independence bears some guilt for Armenia’s unenviable international situation. Some more, some less. But if we only engage in demagogery and accusations and counter-accusations, Armenia’s problems will not be solved. That only justifies today’s failures, both domestic and foreign. Yes, the domestic situation does have a determining effect, but not because it brings on foreign pressures. When there are so many domestic problems, political divisions, serious economic challenges, problems with democracy, all of which cannot be resolved by opening the border, and you add to these this new situation, we will be faced with challenges which we will not be able to withstand unless we have a unified society and a government which enjoys the public’s categoric support.
You mean the challenges involved in the Karabakh resolution process?
Yes, and today those who insist that the Armenia-Turkey process is not linked to the Karabakh process are fooling themselves. I have no other explanation. I don’t exclude the possibility that Turkey will open the border before the Karabakh issue has reached a final resolution. But I do exclude the possibility that they will do so without having received the assurances of the main actors about the return of territories and a resolution of the Karabakh status issue that is to Azerbaijan’s liking. This is the most worrisome. The government’s insistence that the process is not linked to Karabakh or that these are really good documents raises serious questions in my mind about the soundness of the authorities’ judgments. When they really don’t see anything to worry about, then there is reason to worry that tomorrow, in the Karabakh process too, the worse formulations also won’t be a source of concern for them.
Mr. Oskanian, there is also criticism aimed your way saying that both the current Armenia-Turkey negotiations, as well as the Karabakh document on the table today, were born in your days in office.
The shortest answer to that question is that this kind of public, high-level Turkey-Armenia process that is taking place today and that could bring upon us serious pressures on the Karabakh issue did not exist in our day. That’s an irrefutable fact. As to the Karabakh document, it is supposed to be the basis for negotiations, not for hasty solutions. Neither in the Armenia-Turkey case, nor in the case of Karabakh, have we brought any documents to the public for their consideration. Therefore such criticism is baseless.
There are also claims that the dangers that this process may bring for the NK issue are theoretical, but that an open border is essential, and will come at a cost.
That’s the whole issue – at what price. Today they are trying to offer us two erroneous assumptions: one is that the open border is our only salvation. Without at all disputing that an open border is far better than a closed border, let’s also admit that Armenia’s internal, systemic economic and political problems are so many that even partially solving even a few of those problems would have incomparably greater economic effect than an open border. Those problems have nothing to do with a closed border. Further, the open border will not have a direct impact on the life of the average citizen, or will have only a small and short-lived effect, because the opening of the border will also bring with it a variety of economic challenges which will be possible to address only when there is rule of law in our country and not the countless problems which we have today. In exchange for an open border, such capitulation would have been understandable only if Armenia’s very existence depended on it. Is it possible that some people think that we are in that kind of desperate situation?
The second erroneous assumption is that the open border is as necessary for us as the air we breathe and the water we drink, and therefore we must pay that price. With the policies of the past, Armenia has proven countless ways that the Turkish blockade cannot bring us to our knees. The country was experiencing economic growth, there were no concessions in the NK question, and the genocide recognition process was moving forward at a rapid pace and that of course was the source of greatest concern for Turkey. In that sense, we had a great negotiating advantage over Turkey. It is Turkey that is under European pressure regarding opening the border, Turkey’s eastern regions are suffering economically, and they need the open border no less than us. It is Turkey that wishes to play a regional role, and without an open border that is not possible. Each year, it is Turkey that faces the ‘danger’ of possible US recognition of the genocide, and finally, it is the Turkish leadership that has announced a policy of zero problems with neighbors. Today we have given Turkey the opportunity to implement that policy at our expense. Had we taken all these factors into consideration, we could have been a bit more patient and implemented a more prudent diplomacy, so that we could have a more desirable outcome sooner or later. Instead, rather than taking advantage of the situation, the Armenian side has not only agreed to all the preconditions, but has also given Turkey the right to unilaterally determine the opening of the border.
Nevertheless, many insist that even if we accept that the process did not evolve in a way that would have been most beneficial for us, there is no way out now, and the only thing to do is to conclude the process.
If there is the desire to recognize a mistake and correct it, then it’s always possible to find a way out. After all, in Turkey and in the US, and in Europe, they are following the resistance that has been demonstrated both in Armenia and in the Diaspora. It is possible to cite that resistance, and even go to watch the football game, but ask for a ‘time-out’ as far as signing the protocols is concerned, and then, under more comfortable circumstances, return to a confidential, not public format of meetings, and negotiate a more acceptable document. Everything can be put on the right path, if, of course, there is a desire to do so and not to, at all costs, prove that one is right.
Mr. Oskanian, it is obvious today that the executive branch and their majority in parliament are for signing the Armenia-Turkey protocols. It seems nothing stands in their way especially since their representatives constantly say that given the population’s grave socio-economic situation, it is obvious that they support the signing since that is the only way to have the border open.
First, there are more dignified ways to arrive at an open border, I’m certain of that. Today, it’s obvious that both in Armenia, and in the Diaspora the general mood is quite apparent. In Armenia, as a result of discussions, however superficial, and after Serge Sargsyan’s foreign visits, it’s obvious that there is a great deal of resistance to this initiative. As a result of this process, whose dangers were apparent to me early on, our nation finds itself in a complicated situation, from which the government is not trying to extricate itself; rather, it’s further intensifying it.
At the beginning of the Armenia-Turkey process, the political forces were reserved in their comments, and the pitfalls did not seem obvious to many. Was it possible to avoid publicizing these documents and to take the process in another direction?
Of course it was possible, but what we have today is the worst-case scenario. First, the process went public, which on the one hand enticed the Turkish side to exploit the process for its own sake, and as a result, important countries with differing interests engaged at very high levels. Second, the Armenian government succumbed to artificial and senseless timetables which served the interests of other countries. On April 22, they made a statement which provided President Obama with the opportunity not to use the term ‘genocide’; then came the premature publicizing of these protocols with a date for signing that would give Serzh Sargsyan the justification he needs to attend the football game in Turkey. As a result of the administration’s miscalculations and their ignoring obvious realities, we have today two very serious problems. First, a hasty and badly negotiated document which even in the case of the most pragmatic interpretation, goes counter to our national interests. Second, a continuing and unpredictable process on which the Republic of Armenia has zero leverage and influence.
Today it’s a fact that as a result of those documents there is serious tension, to say the least, in our society. Therefore, there is a serious problem with this document, right? But to pull off such an agreement with Turkey, it would have been necessary to enjoy serious majority support. Today, not only is there no such support, but the contrary is true. The authorities had no right to put our people in such a situation.
Mr. Oskanian, your criticism can leave the impression that there is some jealousy or envy.
Any fair-thinking individual would realize that the man who is to sign this document is not to be envied. Further, those who are forced to explain away my criticism by calling it jealousy do so because they can’t publicly accept their own failures, and it turns out they’re well aware that they’re in a difficult situation. During the president’s closed-door meetings with the Diaspora, eve government representatives said that this is a badly negotiated document, but because it’s already on the table, they are forced to defend it. But I would like to point out that this is not something like a tax-legislation package that we can say is not so great, but we can pass it, and then later see about improving it. This is that critical document which assesses our past and pre-determines our future.
But those who defend the documents say that there are no pre-conditions in the protocols and even stress that the words ‘genocide’ or ‘Karabakh’ are not even there.
Did they really think that there, black on white, it was supposed to say that we renounce the genocide issue and Karabakh, too? Those who defend this document, who resist seeing the obvious realities, would, I suppose, find ways to prove their position even if that were the case. You know, if some people don’t wish to see reality, that doesn’t mean that reality does not exist. With these protocols, the Turks have seen expressed their 17 years of preconditions – a commission that studies historic events and documents, and recognition of borders. In fact, since ‘making news’ and ‘taking initiative’ are in vogue in Armenia these days, let me assure you that by signing these protocols, Armenia will indeed be the first in the world in one thing – in the history of diplomacy, there are no other protocols which affirm the recognition of existing borders; there is no such principle in the world. There are more than 190 countries in the world and nearly that many territorial disputes. Those countries have diplomatic relations, recognize each other’s territorial integrity, without confirming each other’s borders, or at least not formulated in such a way. Today, when Aliyev can stand on the lands of Nakhichevan and insolently proclaim that Zangezur is Azerbaijani territory, Armenia’s recognizing Turkey’s present borders is simply political shortsightedness. So, these two preconditions are in fact in this document; while the other one – about Karabakh – is something that Erdogan reminds us about daily. No matter how much the Armenian government insists that NK is not a precondition, no matter how often the co-chairs insist that NK is not a precondition, at the end of the day, who is it who will open the border – the same person who is announcing that NK is indeed a precondition.
Today there are some who analyze the domestic political situation, and issues related to democratization and conclude that all this facilitates foreign pressure on Armenia.
You know, in 18 years, democracy in Armenia has never been in an enviable state. I was foreign minister for 10 years and I can assure all those who don’t know, as well as all those who know but wish to mislead the public, that the international community cannot force a government to take steps it does not wish to take. And those who wish to justify the government’s foreign policy by invoking the idea of foreign pressure, they are simply aiding in the implementation of this flawed policy.
Nevertheless, responding to your criticism, many respond by saying that Armenia was seriously weakened after the last presidential election, after the events of March 1, and thus it became easier for the international community and the superpowers to push the Armenian government to take steps which assume greater risk. And in this context, there is often mention of your share of the guilt.
Every government since independence bears some guilt for Armenia’s unenviable international situation. Some more, some less. But if we only engage in demagogery and accusations and counter-accusations, Armenia’s problems will not be solved. That only justifies today’s failures, both domestic and foreign. Yes, the domestic situation does have a determining effect, but not because it brings on foreign pressures. When there are so many domestic problems, political divisions, serious economic challenges, problems with democracy, all of which cannot be resolved by opening the border, and you add to these this new situation, we will be faced with challenges which we will not be able to withstand unless we have a unified society and a government which enjoys the public’s categoric support.
You mean the challenges involved in the Karabakh resolution process?
Yes, and today those who insist that the Armenia-Turkey process is not linked to the Karabakh process are fooling themselves. I have no other explanation. I don’t exclude the possibility that Turkey will open the border before the Karabakh issue has reached a final resolution. But I do exclude the possibility that they will do so without having received the assurances of the main actors about the return of territories and a resolution of the Karabakh status issue that is to Azerbaijan’s liking. This is the most worrisome. The government’s insistence that the process is not linked to Karabakh or that these are really good documents raises serious questions in my mind about the soundness of the authorities’ judgments. When they really don’t see anything to worry about, then there is reason to worry that tomorrow, in the Karabakh process too, the worse formulations also won’t be a source of concern for them.
Mr. Oskanian, there is also criticism aimed your way saying that both the current Armenia-Turkey negotiations, as well as the Karabakh document on the table today, were born in your days in office.
The shortest answer to that question is that this kind of public, high-level Turkey-Armenia process that is taking place today and that could bring upon us serious pressures on the Karabakh issue did not exist in our day. That’s an irrefutable fact. As to the Karabakh document, it is supposed to be the basis for negotiations, not for hasty solutions. Neither in the Armenia-Turkey case, nor in the case of Karabakh, have we brought any documents to the public for their consideration. Therefore such criticism is baseless.
There are also claims that the dangers that this process may bring for the NK issue are theoretical, but that an open border is essential, and will come at a cost.
That’s the whole issue – at what price. Today they are trying to offer us two erroneous assumptions: one is that the open border is our only salvation. Without at all disputing that an open border is far better than a closed border, let’s also admit that Armenia’s internal, systemic economic and political problems are so many that even partially solving even a few of those problems would have incomparably greater economic effect than an open border. Those problems have nothing to do with a closed border. Further, the open border will not have a direct impact on the life of the average citizen, or will have only a small and short-lived effect, because the opening of the border will also bring with it a variety of economic challenges which will be possible to address only when there is rule of law in our country and not the countless problems which we have today. In exchange for an open border, such capitulation would have been understandable only if Armenia’s very existence depended on it. Is it possible that some people think that we are in that kind of desperate situation?
The second erroneous assumption is that the open border is as necessary for us as the air we breathe and the water we drink, and therefore we must pay that price. With the policies of the past, Armenia has proven countless ways that the Turkish blockade cannot bring us to our knees. The country was experiencing economic growth, there were no concessions in the NK question, and the genocide recognition process was moving forward at a rapid pace and that of course was the source of greatest concern for Turkey. In that sense, we had a great negotiating advantage over Turkey. It is Turkey that is under European pressure regarding opening the border, Turkey’s eastern regions are suffering economically, and they need the open border no less than us. It is Turkey that wishes to play a regional role, and without an open border that is not possible. Each year, it is Turkey that faces the ‘danger’ of possible US recognition of the genocide, and finally, it is the Turkish leadership that has announced a policy of zero problems with neighbors. Today we have given Turkey the opportunity to implement that policy at our expense. Had we taken all these factors into consideration, we could have been a bit more patient and implemented a more prudent diplomacy, so that we could have a more desirable outcome sooner or later. Instead, rather than taking advantage of the situation, the Armenian side has not only agreed to all the preconditions, but has also given Turkey the right to unilaterally determine the opening of the border.
Nevertheless, many insist that even if we accept that the process did not evolve in a way that would have been most beneficial for us, there is no way out now, and the only thing to do is to conclude the process.
If there is the desire to recognize a mistake and correct it, then it’s always possible to find a way out. After all, in Turkey and in the US, and in Europe, they are following the resistance that has been demonstrated both in Armenia and in the Diaspora. It is possible to cite that resistance, and even go to watch the football game, but ask for a ‘time-out’ as far as signing the protocols is concerned, and then, under more comfortable circumstances, return to a confidential, not public format of meetings, and negotiate a more acceptable document. Everything can be put on the right path, if, of course, there is a desire to do so and not to, at all costs, prove that one is right.